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2014 will serve as a test of the United States’ 
claims that its detention policy is consistent with 
the law of armed conflict (LOAC). If, as President 
Obama has repeatedly stated, U.S. involvement 
in the armed conflict in Afghanistan will end this 
year, then any LOAC based detention of bel-
ligerents linked solely to that conflict ends as 
well. That should mean the release or transfer 
of members of the Taliban currently detained at 
Guantanamo. It won’t.
This note outlines the LOAC rationale for deten-
tion in armed conflict and the unsurprising con-
clusion that if the United States is not a party to 
the conflict, the conflict cannot serve as the basis 
for continued detention by the United States of 
belligerents captured therein. Under the LOAC, 
the United States must release or transfer the 
Taliban. Yet, this note predicts that within the next 
year the United States will simultaneously claim 
that it is no longer a party to the conflict and that 
its support of Afghanistan renders continued 
U.S. detention of the Taliban consistent with the 
LOAC.
On 28 January 2014, President Obama delivered 
his State of the Union address to the U.S. Con-
gress.1 During his speech, he stated that “[w]
ith Afghan forces now in the lead for their own 
security, our troops have moved to a support 
role. Together with our allies, we will complete 
our mission there by the end of this year, and 
America’s longest war will finally be over.” In that 
same address, President Obama referenced the 
war in Afghanistan “ending,” “finally be[ing] over,” 
“finally coming to an end,” and “draw[ing] to a 
close.” That the head of state of a party to an 
armed conflict is declaring his country’s involve-
ment over triggers, or should anyway, the re-
lease of enemy belligerents captured during that 
conflict.
Detention of belligerents in an armed conflict to 
1     Washington Post (29 January 2014), “Obama’s 2014 
State of the Union address”.
incapacitate them and prevent their return to the 
battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, 
a proposition on which the U.S. Supreme Court 
claimed “universal agreement and practice”.2  This 
is not a U.S. view, but a recitation of the widely 
recognized understanding that both treaty-based 
and customary LOAC reflect an inherent power to 
detain.3 
But the predicate to LOAC detention authority is 
an armed conflict in which the detaining state is a 
party. While the ongoing non-international armed 
conflict (NIAC) in Afghanistan will most likely con-
tinue beyond 2014, President Obama is quite clear 
that U.S. participation will end. There is no basis, 
under the LOAC, for the continued detention of bel-
ligerents captured in a conflict to which the United 
States is no longer a party. 
This does not mean that on 1 January 2015 the U.S. 
must open the gates of Guantanamo and release 
any and all detainees. The United States will likely 
still be able to credibly claim to be engaged in 
armed conflict (or perhaps a series of conflicts) with 
al-Qaeda. The pros and cons of this argument are 
beyond the scope of this missive. Suffice to say, 
there is at least a potential argument to be made for 
the continued LOAC based detention of members 
of al-Qaeda. 
But even assuming arguendo that U.S. claims of 
a global NIAC with al-Qaeda are legitimate, the 
Taliban remain beyond even that argument’s con-
siderable reach. The Taliban exist in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, which is where they have engaged 
in armed conflict and been captured. The Taliban 
is a party to an armed conflict in Afghanistan (and 
Pakistan), but not beyond.
2     Supreme Court of the United States (28 June 2004), 
”HAMDI et al. v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et 
al.”, No. 03—6696
3    See Pejic, Jelena (31 March 2011), “The protective scope 
of Common Article 3: more than meets the eye”, International 
Review of the Red Cross, No. 881.
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Simply put, if the United States is no longer a 
party to the armed conflict in Afghanistan, there is 
no LOAC basis for U.S. detention of the Taliban. 
In Guantanamo detainee litigation in U.S. federal 
courts, the United States has claimed its deten-
tion policy derives from, or is informed by, the 
LOAC.4  Certainly deriving from or being informed 
by does not mean full or complete compliance, 
nor should it. As a matter of law, Geneva Conven-
tions III and IV do not apply to the NIAC in Af-
ghanistan. But the U.S. will not be able to credibly 
claim any nexus between its detention policy and 
the LOAC if in 2015 it continues armed conflict 
based detention while claiming its involvement in 
that conflict has ended.
At the end of 2014 and the end of U.S. involve-
ment in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the 
United States could act consistently with the 
LOAC. This would entail either releasing the 
members of the Taliban detained at Guantanamo 
or transferring them to the only remaining party to 
that conflict – Afghanistan. 
Given U.S. detention policy over the last decade, 
combined with political dysfunction in Washing-
ton, neither of those outcomes is likely. Instead, 
the United States will likely employ yet another 
“heads I win, tails you lose” interpretation that has 
so undermined its standing in the international 
community and called into question its commit-
ment to the rule of law. 
Under this approach, President Obama will, 
unfortunately, resemble the two faced Roman 
god Janus. For domestic purposes, the President 
will claim that for the United States, the war in 
Afghanistan is over. But in terms of the Taliban 
at Guantanamo, the United States will continue 
to claim detention authority based on the armed 
conflict in which the President said the U.S. is no 
longer involved. The U.S. will support this conten-
tion by citing the continued presence of U.S. ser-
vice members in Afghanistan, albeit in a support 
role. Depending on the amount of U.S. troops 
and their function in Afghanistan, that could have 
the makings of a credible argument. But it would 
mean that the U.S. was still a party to the con-
flict, which flies in the face of President Obama’s 
pronouncements to the contrary.
4     United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
“Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s 
Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guanta-
namo Bay”, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH).
President Obama’s pronouncements of war’s 
end, combined with political realities in the United 
States, juxtaposed against LOAC release require-
ments create a tautological “do loop” akin to Jo-
seph Heller’s Catch-22 – you would think a state 
would stop detaining individuals held to prevent 
their return to a conflict in which the State is no 
longer a party. 
Don’t be too sure. 
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